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Abstract: Gateways to Modernity: Niccolo Machiavelli and Max Weber. The 
Birth of Occidental Rationality. Heinz Steinert’s recent work on Max Weber’s 
Calvinist thesis is challenging and thought provoking, but hardly convincing. 
There are reasons to believe that Weber’s views on the birth of Modernity 
will survive also this assault. Steinert, however, brings in a methodological 
dimension about how to interpret classics in the proper pursuit of intellec-
tual history, in the search for a pragmatic balance between formative experi-
ences, context and tradition.
Niccolo Machiavelli and Max Weber are both manifestations of Modernity, 
in different epochs. There are amazingly many affinities between them. They 
both need to be understood and interpreted in context, yet being significant 
in a long line in intellectual history, characterized by anti-metaphysics, calcu-
lability and demise of natural law. Weber’s value-philosophy makes ready soil 
for rationalization of value-hierarchies, further developed by Gunnar Myrdal 
in his social engineering. Machiavelli’s amazing modernity is an embryonic 
early bird to instrumental means-end rational policy analysis and part of a 
tradition with Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf and Jeremy Bentham as 
important way-stations. This tradition has many opponents. Steinert is right 
in most of his criticism of Weber’s analysis but has not much new to add, 
except a more clear emphasis on the Bismarckian Kulturkampf against cos-
mopolitan forces, such as Marxism and Catholicism, as main elements in 
Weber’s context. 
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Preamble
Heinz Steinert’s Max Webers unwiderlegbare Fehlkonstruktionen. Die protestantische 
Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus invites to many arguments, about the nature of 
the genesis of modern capitalism, the irreversible rationalization as the destiny of 
the West and the Rest of the world as well, and the rational actor model as an anti-
ideal-type (or ideal ideal-type, an interpretation with lots of supportive evidence in 
Weber’s methodological essays, in particular from 1908 and 1913), presentism vs. 
contextualism in the understanding of a classic author, the evidence problems of 
counterfactuals, and configurations of Modernity. 
What I find particularly challenging is how to navigate between the Scylla 
and Charybdis of presentism/retrospectivism on the one hand and contex tua-
lism/“historicism” on the other – and here the problems of interpretation raised by 
Steinert’s attack on Weber can be seen as an illuminating case. Tradition and Long 
lines1 in intellectual history open for a pragmatic balance.
Max Weber has served as a ‘sparring partner’ to the modern Multi-modernity 
paradigm, although Alfred Weber and Eric(h) Voegelin are more direct sources of 
inspiration, to Eisenstadt, Arnason and Wittrock.2 There are several Weichenstellun-
gen along the roads to our predicament of late Modernity. Ideas are admittedly best 
interpreted in their contexts, as argued by the Cambridge school of “Ideas in Con-
text”. In the strict and hardly realistic program of Quentin Skinner we should ideally 
even forget everything that happened after the period under study and restrict our-
selves to be “recording angels”. A better understanding of the “Quentin Skinner and 
his Critics”-nexus results in less of erratic chronocentrism and posthumous hijack-
ing of classics for presentist purposes, a recurrent phenomenon in the case of Max 
Weber.3 Yet it is hard to imagine that we could fully escape our own language com-
munity. Possibly long lines in intellectual history is a way to find an appropriate bal-
ance between our concerns of today, in our search for identity by help of classics, 
and avoiding erroneous “creative extensions” (e.g. Talcott Parsons) of “dead white 
Europeans males”, for natural reasons more concerned with their problems than 
our problems of today. Machiavelli and Weber are both significant manifestations of 
Modernity, with lots of similarities, such as nation building and also methodologi-
cal precepts of a modern “scientific” kind. There are early birds, such as Marsilius of 
Padua and Thomas Aquinas.4 
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Introduction
Steinert’s title might promise more than delivered; Weber’s “Calvinist thesis” might 
be impossible to confront with tests but from that does not follow that it is an erra-
tic construction.
Steinert emphasizes that Weber’s focus shifted between 1904, 1905 and 1920, 
from the birth of capitalism to the broader issue of birth of Modernity. „Nicht Kapi-
talismus sei spezifisch für den ‚Okzident‘, sondern dieser Rationalismus auf allen 
Gebieten mit der Tendenz zu einer zunehmenden ‚Rationalisierung‘“.5 Rational-
ization is the main category under which the rest is to become subsumed. Cal-
vinism and predestination and how to explain Fordism is important but does not 
exhaust Weber’s theme, which is, moreover, dictated by contextual concerns, as part 
of Bismarck’s Kulturkampf, against cosmopolitan movements such as Marxism and 
Catholicism. This might be the main achievement of Steinert: that he contextual-
izes more nuanced than is mostly done in Anglo-Saxon secondary literature, where 
there are natural limits to what might have fertile soil in a readership not familiar 
with German domestic politics. This has inhibited progress in issues of interpreta-
tion where context evidently matters.
Modernization is a concept which is often characterized by rationalization, secu-
larization, mass mobilization (democratization), bureaucratization, industrializa-
tion and individualization, all indicating a still on-going transformation process 
starting around 1500 with some “early birds” during the era of the Gregorian Popes. 
How these indicators relate to each other not lucid, and secularization is mostly seen 
as a main feature, the meaning of which is disputed. Moreover, concepts of modern-
ization and rationalization appear as overlapping. For one bridge-building overview 
of German Modernization from American horizon, see Randall Collins.6 
There are many contributions starting “Max Weber and …” … and then fill in 
almost whatever you wish. It is thus amazing that nobody really as yet wrote about 
the many affinities between Max Weber and Niccolo Machiavelli, as two prominent 
representatives of Western Modernization, from two formative periods, four centu-
ries apart.7 Both connect past and present and they both promote the breakthrough 
to Modernity. Modern capitalist rationality had its origin or at least take-off in the 
West. Weber’s Calvinist thesis is a dominant hypothesis, still going strong. It does 
not exclude other paths to modern rationality, with “Fordism”, calculability and rule 
of law. Singapore offers one example of this. 
Weber and Machiavelli are both anti-natural law thinkers with the rational actor 
model as basic metaphor and their contributions could be subsumed under the 
common label secularization of social thought.
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The structure of their analyses is instrumental means-end-rationality. They can 
both be seen as proto-rational-choice thinkers. 
Nevertheless they are both time-bound and must be interpreted in their respec-
tive historical context, which can be characterized as “nation-building” or in Machi-
avelli’s case rather state formation, a rational establishment of the monopoly of vio-
lence in a specific territory.
Contingency, timing, the successful combination of virtu and fortuna, is impor-
tant to both. To catch the right moment is crucial in the art of politics.8 Rational-
ity helps, but not all the way. The contractarian individual utility approach of both 
thinkers are in contrast to sociological thinking which really has its take off with 
the Four stages theories in Scottish Enlightenment and with Samuel Pufendorf as 
an early bird. There are other early birds, such as Marsilius of Padua and Thomas 
Aquinas.9 
It is true that “theory plus a dash of history (the reading of a canonical author 
from the past according to a present-day theoretical agenda) does not produce his-
tory”.10 It is equally true that social scientists today are normally driven by a search 
for identity and roots when approaching the classics, even if it is clear that classics 
are not up-to-date guides.
I would suggest that what I call “Whiggish” contextualism is a reasonable balance 
between Quentin Skinner and his Critics.11 We have had enough of both creative 
extensions of Weber and his methodological precepts and of “Lazarus-approaches” 
as well (“What would Weber today …? … if reawakened from the dead ones”). Skin-
ner’s mementoes for the proper pursuit of intellectual history cannot be ignored, but 
would in programmatic use (un-thinking everything we know about what happened 
later) produce very arid results.
Steinert’s work has aroused reactions and is a bouncy and eloquent rhetoric 
attack against Weber’s central thesis, even almost claiming that no Protestant ethic 
exists. Otherwise most points Steinert makes are no doubt well founded, and hard 
to refute. They are, however, hardly innovative and he kicks in already wide open 
doors. Yet his book has relevance for the perennial issue of the nature and birth of 
Occidental Modernity and inherent problems of interpretation. That social science 
is a battle-field for concept formation is a well-known fact, and Modernity is a cen-
tral and vague and contested concept. 
To account for and elaborate common traits in the oeuvres of Machiavelli and 
Weber might be one way to catch the core of Modernity – and provide a critical per-
spective on challengers such as the Multi-Modernity approach, often spoken of as 
a new paradigm, answering to a less Western ethnocentric and more universal or 
global approach in science history.
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There are strong affinities between the methodological precepts of Weber and 
Machiavelli, two thinkers of Modernity from two stages of its development. Weber 
does not refer a whole lot to Machiavelli but it is a significant formative early influ-
ences.
Misunderstanding Weber – and Machiavelli
Already at the age of twelve years Weber was reading Machiavelli. “I have looked at 
uncle Julian Schmidt’s books (Julian Schmidt was a liberal author of a widely read 
History of German Literature, a friend of Gustav Freytag, my remark, SE) and glanced 
through Herder’s Cid; now I am busy with reading Machiavelli’s Principe …”.12
Machiavelli (“Old Nic”, “Murderous Machiavelli”) is a misunderstood public 
intellectual avant la lettre who has generated lots of reactions for or against, and 
who has many followers, only to mention modern management literature. He has 
a high omnipresence in Germany in the late 19th century. One reaction against him 
is the German migrant scholar J. P. Mayer who spent the war years during WW2 in 
England. He deals with Machiavelli’s role for Weber in a way bordering on “guilt by 
association”.
J. P. Mayer’s purpose in laying bare the Machiavelli-link in Weber seems to be 
to place him in a tradition of “neo-Machiavellism”, from a standpoint of Christian 
morals. Although Mayer has a lot of admiration for Weber’s scholarship he insists 
that Weber “was never able to free himself from the ‘blood and iron’ pattern” and 
stresses Weber’s inability to see through his own prejudices, “as his acceptance of the 
power-state idea … prove”.13
Several commentators later carry on similar lines of criticism. Wolfgang Momm-
sen writes, referring to Mayer: „Max Weber has been accused of teaching the Ger-
man nation a ‚new Machiavellism of the steel age’ because of these views (power pri-
macy, my remark) and because of his uncompromising support of the power state“ 
and further „Like Machiavelli, Max Weber assumed that power took primacy in 
the conflict of duties and idolized the model of those citizens who, in Machiavelli’s 
words, ‚held the greatness of their native city to be of greater importance than the 
salvation of their souls’“.14
Mayer and Mommsen basically share a tendency to moralistic criticism, al though 
Mommsen is more subtle and elaborated. The religious echoes in Mayer are absent 
in Mommsen, who appears more as a moralistic liberal with a natural law tendency. 
They also judge the relationship differently. Speaking of “Realpolitik” Mayer says: 
“Bismarck’s example made Max Weber understand the lessons of Machiavelli’s Prin-
cipe”.15 Mommsen interprets this in another fashion, in criticizing Mayer for „nai-
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ven Gleichschaltung von Realpolitik mit machiavellistischer Gesinnungslosigkeit, 
die Weber scharf bekämpfte”.16
Mommsen does not make full justice to Machiavelli but has a more nuanced 
view of the influences Weber picks up from the Florentine scholar. Weber’s Machi-
avellism is by both Mommsen and Mayer interpreted rather derogatory and related 
to two interrelated features in Weber’s thought, i.e. his pronounced stress on Macht-
staat and Machtinstinkte and the supposed tension between his strong patriotism 
and his ethics of responsibility.
The relationship between Weber and Machiavelli is also noticed by French 
scholars, like Raymond Aron and Eugene Fleischmann, in a similar vein. We seem-
ingly need a more cognitive understanding of Weber’s and Machiavelli’s projects and 
methodological affinities. Although Weber is a fountainhead for competing sociolo-
gies he is also an anti-sociologist within sociology, part of a much longer tradition, 
of secularization of social thought.
The many parallels are intriguing for several reasons, e.g. their relevance for how 
to approach classic authors. Context evidently matters, as Quentin Skinner and other 
scholars claim. But classics cannot be reduced to their contexts, and evidently other 
factors are at work, such as formative experiences and tradition. Weber wrote in a 
“proto-rational choice”–tradition, and Machiavelli might in fact have founded that 
tradition, without any intention to do so; he was rather living in a realm of Ancient 
republicanism and very old virtues, typical of a city state world, although with Cap-
italism in its cradle in Florence and rational so called Double (Italian) bookkeeping 
invented, early forms of trade unions shaping up, etc. 
Calculability and rational actor-paradigm is a significant step towards the secu-
larization of social thought. Machiavelli and Weber carry straws to the same stack.
To avoid uncontrolled value-intrusion is crucial in instrumental means-end-
rational policy science promoting postulated goals. Machiavelli and Weber pioneer 
such endeavours.
Scientific value-relativism: J. P. Mayer implies a conflict between Weber’s emphasis 
on objectivity in social science, and Weber’s own value-commitments. This is not 
downright wrong – Weber had a dual syndrome between scientific creed and polit-
ical engagement: “two souls are dwelling in my bosom” is a Faustian expression, 
which could well apply to Weber, who sometimes spoke of politics as his “secret 
love”.17
However, there is an element of “political reductionism” in this sort of criticism 
of Weber, in so far as it erroneously implies something about the cognitive qualities 
of Weber’s analyses. It fails to catch the universal methodological core of Weber’s 
contribution. A certain lack of acquaintance with the methodological meaning of 
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Weber’s views on value-relation (Wertbeziehung) is part of the background, the poli-
tical agenda overshadowing the scientific one. Weber might partly have caused this 
himself, since his famous “twin lectures”18 do express a more blunt view on value 
freedom – more in line with the one assumed by his vulgar critics – than one finds 
in Weber’s more sophisticated methodological essays, in particular the Objecti-
vity essay from 1904, and also the Sinn der Wertfreiheit-essay from 1917, texts in 
which value freedom is qualified to value relation or value-orientation. Values as 
such, somewhat paradoxically, serve the purpose of objectivity and intersubjectivity, 
through being made explicit. 
Weber’s value relativism is developed as a qualification from value freedom to 
value relevance which is not immediately manifest in the twin-lectures.
Steinert reflects upon Weber’s value-aspect-choice methodology, as I call it with 
a nebulous but pedagogic term, and the use of Wertgesichtspunkten, invoking H. H. 
Bruun’s (2001) authority.19 This is central to my concern.
“Vorbemerkung”, at the very beginning of GARS, is one key text to the under-
standing of Weber’s intentions in his comparative sociology of religion and the 
unique ness of Occidental culture and science, especially the first couple of pages, 
where he also invokes the authority of Machiavelli, to envision the difference bet-
ween Western rationalism and India. He stresses the lack of rational conceptualiza-
tion in “The Rest” and modern science as specific to the West. Moreover, rational 
calculation and capitalism go hand in hand. Rational book-keeping is only one note-
worthy example of the rationality that emerges during the Renaissance.
Weber shares the same notion in applied value philosophy that later on is develo-
ped by Gunnar Myrdal and Arnold Brecht,20 that values are indispensable as points 
of departure for cognitive inquiry but that the explicit use of values as tools for 
selection from vast reality at the same time is a remedy against uncontrolled value 
in trusion (value bias). The procedure becomes part of the standard positions of 
mainstream social science, as well as history, as a way to cope with matters of selec-
tion and intersubjectivity. The so called scientific value relativism is a virulent doc-
trine, resisting many critiques. Weber had a part in laying down the foundations of 
modern instrumental policy science, means-end-analyses rationalizing value-hier-
archies. He is a link in the chain between Saint-Simonian social engineering and the 
piecemeal social engineering of the 1930s, except for the Enlightenment optimism 
of progress, not attuned to Weber’s dark “iron cage”-vision, of our modern “squirrel’s 
wheel”. Philosophically the gulf-doctrine between “is” and “ought” could be traced 
back to the radical anti-metaphysics in Hume and perhaps even Occam. Philosophy 
is ahead of its applications. 
However, not until the days of the great Methodenstreit and the ensuing crisis of 
historicism that Troeltsch21 – Weber’s good friend and neighbour – defines, are the 
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consequences for cumulative science really taken into account, by Weber and his 
contemporaries.
The inherent predicament of relativism and value-incommensurability22 that fol-
lows from historicism is a hard blow to any belief in objective time-less norms and 
natural law thinking. The historicists themselves did not always see this and could 
adhere to objective values. However, since the main meaning – the core – of histo-
ricism is the denial of the universal character of laws and norms, instead stressing 
the culture-bound historicity and uniqueness of both, this in Germany most domi-
nant tradition was very vulnerable, having something to explain in order to preserve 
reliability. This generated the crisis that Weber responded to, in his methodological 
essays after his recovery from his own nervous crisis.
It is notable that several scholars at about the same time expressed related albeit 
not identical views on the important matter of objective norms. In the North we refer 
to Axel Hägerström, who in fact launched the negative value-ontology in a more sys-
tematic and consequent way than anybody else, in his famous inauguration speech 
from 1911, in which he says “there is no science in morals, only about morals”.23 
Hägerström’s so called value-nihilism or emotive value-philosophy is very conse-
quent, combining a negative value-ontology with a non-cognitivistic value-sentence 
theory. As Aleksander Peczenik remarks in his “Introduction” to an edited volume 
based on the transaction at the IVR (The International Association for Philosophy 
of Law and Social Philosophy) conference in Lund summer 2003: “Hägerström’s cri-
tical philosophy is not easy to refute”.24 I have not seen any successful refutation.
In Finland Edvard Westermarck’s anthropological relativism contributes to the 
same scepticism regarding firm moral norms to be proven scientific with regard to 
theoretical “validity”. Westermarck, who spent a lot of time in Morocco and Cam-
bridge, UK, wrote about the variations in norm systems, a subject matter that had 
been on the agenda since Thomas Aquinas and (more so) Marsilius of Padua  – 
but not really before – and causing problems of identity within the realm of social 
science. The “Death of God” in Enlightenment generated tensions between know-
ledge and belief (faith). Even if the peak of this today also post-Modern theme 
occurs in the early 1900s, there is fertile soil in philosophy, already through vari-
ous Scottish moralists and Hume in particular. Moreover, the theme is with us very 
much today, in post-Modern agony of choice and incommensurability between vari-
ous “good” values, a problem agenda we also find in Isaiah Berlin’s work.25 The anxi-
ety and necessity of choice is our post-Enlightenment destiny.
In Vienna Hans Kelsen’s legal positivism is well attuned to this anti-natural law 
trend, even if Kelsen himself maintained that laws are also morally binding – and 
not merely conventions and regularities. It is in my view noteworthy that Weber, 
Kelsen, Hägerström and Westermarck were quite contemporary and rather inde-
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pendent of each other. They knew, however, of each other to some – limited – extent. 
Hägerström and Kelsen had a confrontation in a debate that Professor Lagerroth in 
Lund arranged. Weber was somewhat familiar with Westermarck.
There are differences between Weber and for instance Hägerström. While the 
latter holds that values are neither true nor false, or in a sharper variation always 
false, Weber rather says that we cannot say whether they are true or false, by scien-
tific means. The consequences for cognitive science – in contrast to in moral philo-
sophy – are the same in both cases but Weber’s neo-Kantian infinite regress has the 
door a little bit open for future advancement into what is today regarded as meta-
physical realms; that the border between science and meta-physics could be altered 
in an to us un-known future. Hägerström is much more programmatic in his anti-
metaphysical stance. Both could, however, be subsumed under the same general 
doctrine of scientific value-relativism. The structure of what I would call “normative 
empirical theory”, i.e. means-end-rationality from explicit points of departures that 
cannot be proven, but have to be postulated, satisfies in both cases the view that one 
cannot scientifically legitimately derive an “ought” from an “is” – or the reverse. We 
need value-objectives but cannot find them. This makes ready soil for the Weber-
Myrdal pragmatic solution.
Since Weber holds that one cannot prove the validity or truth of a value – in con-
trast to his mentor Rickert who manifests a lingering value-objectivism somewhat 
inconsistent with his own philosophy – Weber makes no attempts to justify his own 
national liberal position. In recent years H. H. Bruun has returned to the Weber-
Rickert nexus, drawing on new material, the so called Nervi fragments, as noted by 
Steinert.26 Bruun is convincingly moving the research frontier towards the end of the 
road of this perennial Iris-apple within Weberology.
Weber’s point of view is postulated, as the starting point, which is needed for 
his rational means-end-analyses. The structure of normative empirical theory, early 
policy science, if we wish, is at hand already in Freiburger Antrittsrede, a decade 
before it is explicitly developed in Weber’s methodological essays. It is in fact embry-
onic already in Machiavelli’s work, for that matter. 
In reality one finds competing value-hierarchies, and science is of no help in 
our choosing between them, since pure value judgments, for example understood 
in terms of “good” or “bad”, have no real reference. They cannot be intersubjectively 
operationalized in the same sense as statements concerning for instance size or tem-
perature. The impossibility to make rational choices between ultimate values could 
be characterized as the polytheist dilemma in post-Enlightenment, creating the exis-
tentialist anxiety of choice so well expressed by Nietzsche and Kierkegaard on the 
level of general philosophy – and finding its methodological expression in Weber’s 
“value-aspect-choice-methodology” (“perspectivism”).
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Scientific value-relativism could be seen as a “smallest common denominator” 
for a number of similar positions, as our short presentation of Weber vs. Hägerström 
has exemplified. The polemic front in common is against natural law thinking. In 
the case of Machiavelli four centuries earlier it is more appropriate to speak about 
a-natural law thinking. In the case of Gunnar Myrdal the choice is institutionalized, 
since his demand that values serving as points of departure should be significant and 
relevant to the social context in which it functions is a restriction that in his case is 
operationalized in terms of ideologies of parties or goals of social movements, a top-
down social engineering peaking in the period 1930–86. Weber rather saw the pro-
fessor as the one to generate or manifest the proper cultural values. In fact, nation 
and culture are very close in Weber’s preferences, since he felt that the dignity of the 
human being was the basic concern, and that the German cultural creed had a spe-
cial mission here, between East and West.
Scientific value relativism is also ecumenical in the sense that it does not really 
presuppose a definite answer to the old chestnut question whether social thought 
should be primarily a normative or cognitive undertaking, it rather regulates the 
proper relationship between the two realms, in order to promote cognitive know-
ledge and adjust to scientific criteria, such as testability. 
In paradoxically utilizing values as the very selection criteria that enables inter-
subjectivity Weber’s scientific value-relativism in fact does what J. P. Mayer claims 
he was ignorant of. Mayer writes that: “The substance of Weber’s world consists of 
an unbridgeable tension between values and science. He has misinterpreted Socrates 
and Plato for whom values and science were inseparably bound together.”27 Now 
Weber’s qualification from Wertfreiheit to Wertbeziehung – the concept he takes over 
from Rickert and elaborates – means precisely this, building a bridge over the gap 
between is and ought. 
There is a long tradition of anti-metaphysics, embryonic in Machiavelli and via 
Hobbes, Hume and Bentham built into today’s social science as a modus vivendi-
standard position. The gulf between is and ought has a bridge and its name is rational 
action-model, the ideal-type we in fact find in Weber’s methodological essays. 
Weber’s Calvinist-thesis is a rational reconstruction of Puritan rationality with 
its unintended consequences, to explain the origin of capitalism, one major feature 
of Modernity, which is a stepwise “historical individual” in many guises.
Especially in the US – the homeland of Fordism – there is an industry of com-
parative studies with Weber’s thesis as point of departure, in the search for the inde-
pendent variable. „Die ‚protestantische Ethik‘ ist, ohne viel Theologie, längst iden-
tisch mit dem ‚amerikanischen Traum‘. Die ‚Weber-These‘ lebt weiter und ist plausi-
bel, weil sie in einer banalisierten Form der (säkularisierten) Wirtschafstreligion in 
der USA entspricht.“28 The real estate capitalist Donald Trump becomes an indica-
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tor of Weber’s Calvinist thesis in it’s American guise.29 But the historical philosophi-
cal scope of Weber’s thesis is much broader, a grand narrative of Western rationaliza-
tion. Moreover, Steinert’s study promotes a shift from the American dream of entre-
preneurialism to a context of cultural cleavages within Germany. One might say that 
in the categories of Quentin Skinner Weber’s work is performative, and a political 
contribution to the Kulturkampf. 
Tradition
The numerous parallels between Weber and Machiavelli (see Appendix 1) illus trate 
a methodological dilemma, as well as the lingering relevance of old and dead thin-
kers. There are so many striking parallels between Machiavelli and Weber. They are 
significant, indicating that context has to be supplemented by tradition, for the full 
understanding and best interpretation. They both contribute to the same long term 
project, which I call the Long line of secularization (see Appendix 2) characterized 
by anti-natural law and calculability and with the rational economic actor as main 
metaphor or “model” (ideal-type). The “long line of secularization” as an organizing 
notion violates a pure contextualism (what Skinner himself would rather target as 
textualism) and yet appears as clarifying in our search for identity and roots, which 
might be the rationale for dealing with “Dead White European Males” in any case. 
Machiavelli and Weber have survived and reach out to ever changing readerships in 
new generations. Nation-building is the main policy-concern of both.
In the case of Florentine thinkers in early Modernity/late Medieval times they 
were innocently unaware of the dangers of chronocentrism, since they conceived of 
their city state as a natural continuation of Greek Antiquity, the step between Athens 
and Florence was not a dramatic one. The time span between Machiavelli’s Italy and 
Weber’s Germany is more pronounced. 
To repeat, there are two waves of Modernization and secularization/rationaliza-
tion. The Renaissance and the Reformation give birth to individualism and the ratio-
nal actor model, while Scottish Enlightenment gives birth to sociology, a significant 
younger project than the one Machiavelli, Hobbes and Weber was engaged in, res-
ponding to an arising interest in learning what goes on below the surface of indus-
trialized capitalist society.
Rational and contractarian approach is not sociology, which deals with pheno-
mena “beneath”, although James Coleman has made impressive efforts to apply ratio-
nal calculated action also to such phenomena as stock market panic and lynch mobs.30
Weber is not really a founding father of sociology, as Parsons suggests in a wish-
ful creative extension that, however, saved Weber for posterity. He is merely an 
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“adopted father”. The discipline of sociology hardly existed in Weber’s days. He only 
hesitantly and gradually becomes a “sociologist”. His academic profession is Volks-
wirtschaftslehre or Nationalökonomie but he has a background as a lawyer (his first 
position was as a teacher in commercial law in Berlin) and of course he is a histo-
rian, as almost all German mandarins in the younger historical school. As late as in 
Wissenschaft als Beruf Weber characterizes himself as a political economist, already 
in the second sentence. He can at least be seen as a proto-rational choice thinker, just 
as Swedberg and Norkus conceive of him.31 
While sociology has its roots in Scottish Enlightenment and so called Four stage 
theories, of Ferguson, Millar and Smith, Weber belongs to an older and perhaps 
stronger tradition, going back to early Modernity, with Machiavelli as an “early bird” 
and Hobbes as the real “Newton”, anticipating themes on the agenda for also Parsons 
and Habermas. Today rational-choice is the most elaborate version of the long tradi-
tion to which both Machiavelli and Weber belong. This is in a way a continuation of 
the old Methodenstreit, which is recurring. Weber sides with Menger’s marginalism 
in order to help Schmoller’s historicists. This might be both arguable and debateable 
but there is lots of supportive evidence.32
Obviously Quentin Skinner would be unhappy with such a construction as the 
long line of secularization, with its risks for teleology; he would find it too “whig-
gish”. It has to be kept in mind that there is no inherent goal in intellectual history – 
but in all times several optional alternatives.
The demise of natural law is a very slow process and both Machiavelli and Weber 
are acting in hostile environments, in the sense that there is an ever recurring ten-
dency to “backdoor-normativism”. Machiavelli had Savonarola’s theocracy as proxi-
mite background, and Weber had value-rational state idealists, such as Treitschke.
Hobbes and Bentham are working in the same direction as are Machiavelli and 
Weber, only to mention two more prominent cases. It is quite possible to integrate 
even such thinkers as Locke and Rousseau in the same line of thought, although this 
obviously calls for some “Procrustean” ad hoc-arguments about their proper inter-
pretation. Hutchinson and Mandeville definitely are steps forward in the seculari-
zing direction.
Despite some terminological confusion Hobbes’s utilitarian arguments really 
mean only secularized natural law. There is no need for any natural law notions in 
his Newtonian system of political analysis. God is moved from the context of disco-
very to the context of justification. Natural law remains as merely an empty label for 
our basic instincts in short and brutish lives in the state of war, with its fear.
Bentham is very explicit in his criticism of natural law and definitely marks a 
further step from jus to lex, in his characterization of natural law as nonsense on 
stilts and right and wrong as fictitious entities. The paradigm that is in common 
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to Machiavelli, Hobbes (and Pufendorf), Bentham, Weber – and later on Gunnar 
Myrdal – is really a manifestation of what is today labelled as modern policy science, 
with rational economic man as a basic model (”cost-benefit” analysis). Rational cal-
culation is an important thread in common to all scholars in this tradition. 
It is more a rule-making than a law-making activity, which is clear for instance 
from Weber’s Objectivity-essay. A pure nomothetic approach, in which reality exclu-
sively is regarded as phenomena to be explained, is evidently more rare in the field 
of social science: indeed Popper and Hempel themselves would not argue for it. The 
Popper-Hempel covering law could always be applied – but how seminal?
The Norm-sender Problem 
A common problem to Weber and Machiavelli should be “Who is the norm-sender?” 
or, differently formulated, where to find the point of departure, the “entrance-value” 
that the procedure of instrumental analysis calls for? Weber does not discuss the 
validity of his own value-preferences  – but he never hides them, quite the con-
trary. His inaugural speech (Freiburger Antrittsrede from the mid-1890s) is illus-
trative in this sense, with its vehement nationalist and bourgeois tone, yet never 
allowed to distort instrumentality in policy recommendations.33 In fact the clear 
policy re commendation, which the combination of explicit values and “sociologi-
cal” analysis allow for, is a step forward from previous activities within the Verein 
für Sozialpolitik. Although the relative importance of nationalism vs. liberalism over 
the years in Weber’s hierarchies of values is a matter of interpretation it is still clear 
that he adheres to these values without any claim to validity. From the retrospective 
perspective of “post-1989” Weber’s allegiances might appear as offensive. This was, 
however, hardly the case in the Gründerjahre of Wilhelmine Germany. In fact, the 
way in which Weber differs from his more value-rational nationalistic colleagues is 
precisely through the instrumentality of his arguments, that he managed to “hold his 
horses”, control his value engagement when it could hurt the instrumentality of his 
means-end-analyses. That his “Faustian” predicament was a strain on his nerves is 
clear, for instance when he quarrels with Schumpeter in a coffee house in Vienna – 
and leaves in anger, even forgetting his hat, as witnessed by Felix Somary.34 
Nationalism appears to be the “top-value” in Weber, at least his liberalism is not 
of the absolute kind; as a normative creed. It is coloured by the failures of 1848 in 
Frankfurt am Main and the legacy of the Bismarckian Obrigkeitsstaat. The historical 
roots are much deeper, only to mention Napoleon’s role for modern liberal constitu-
tionalism as reflected in the famous letter to brother Jerome, when he became king 
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of Westphalia. The Bavarian historian Thomas Nipperdey has covered Napoleon’s 
very complex role for German state formation.35 
If scientific objectivity is to be obtained with the help of values as criteria of selec-
tion when abstracting from vast reality what is of importance in the specific case – 
which is the actual procedure in Weber’s ideal-type methodology with its individual 
rationality – the values could, however, not be chosen arbitrarily. 
This opens for various solutions to perennial problems, of polytheism and sig-
nificance/relevance. The individual is stuck in an existentialist dilemma, once “God 
is dead”, as the encyclopaedians of Enlightenment said. Firm norms are a remedy 
against frustration. Yet, we have to live with the pessimistic insight that “is” and 
“ought” are separated, in the sense that the latter cannot be derived from the for-
mer, without some unproved ultimate value as “arbitrary” vehicle in the value-rela-
tion that structures social reality. The individual has to take on the responsibility of 
his own value-choices, thus creating meaning, which is necessary to avoid pure post-
modernist disorientation (Nietzsche and Kierkegaard).36 
As Weber (as well as later on Myrdal) demonstrates there is no necessary con-
nection between personal value-preferences and the conduct of intersubjective nor-
mative theory, providing recommendations for actions instrumental to accomp-
lish defined goals. Rationalizing value-hierarchies should preferably be relevant for 
some significant actors, e.g. social and/or political movements. 
The professors had a task in identifying with the pan-German national enter-
prise and articulate the steering ideas of the new nation. Weber could find his values 
in culture; so did Rickert, who in places lapses back into lingering natural law, not 
consistent with the basic character of the value philosophy of “The father of histori-
cal relativism”, as Rickert is called. Weber’s high esteem of German culture as a top-
value is expressed in “Wahlrecht und Demokratie”.37 
The way in which Weber differs from Myrdal is intriguing. Myrdal in brief repre-
sents a more institutionalized mode of catching value points of departure, with a role 
for parties and organizations to make his values relevant and significant. Myrdal’s 
views on objectivity are a derivation of Weber and Hägerström. 
Machiavelli was not aware of the methodological problems that Weber and 
Myrdal dealt with  – but still nevertheless provided their practical solutions in a 
realm which Aquinas and Marsilius left to be filled, making the ruler the purchaser 
of his handbook in statecraft. This is one aspect of Machiavelli’s “amazing moder-
nity”. 
It is not that clear to which extent Machiavelli reflected over the norm-sender 
problem. Notable is that his actual procedure does not violate the instrumentality of 
his policy science, i.e. for instance his recommendations how to unify Italy or create 
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stable government. Machiavelli does not speak about God, which is in sharp con-
trast to almost all previous analyses. 
God is mentioned by Machiavelli. There are no reasons to believe that he was 
not a religious man, only to note that God has no place in his very secular analy-
sis, where the aim is inner-worldly in a sense that would be rather alien to Medie-
val analysts. 
Towards the background of Steinert’s criticism of Weber’s stress on the Puritan 
legacy in the Modernist take off one might observe that there is no Puritan element 
in Northern Italy; yet the city states in Tuscany being cradles for modern capitalism, 
with trade unions and textile industry, etc. 
His line of reasoning has a secular and instrumental tone, which simply sounds 
new; he actually appears as centuries in advance of his own time. Yet his policy stu-
dies are an adequate answer to the Florentine situation, with dangerous and deman-
ding neighbours, both Italian and foreign, and constitutional instability, a leadership 
and a legitimacy problem. 
His diplomatic experiences, conversations with Cesare Borgia, and negotiations 
with neighbouring powers, the French king, etc, provided the inner-worldly aims, 
not quite to become fulfilled until 1870, with the capture of Rome. The tight relation 
to societal context is central to a realistic appreciation of Machiavelli’s contribution 
to the development of social analysis. 
The classics and their historicity: The combination of time-less validity and time-
bound tasks are in common to Weber and Machiavelli. They try to answer (similar) 
questions of their respective days in a way that has a methodological perennial rele-
vance and still need fuel from the immediate societal surrounding, with its agenda 
of nation building and legitimation of power. 
True, Machiavelli as a pioneer in modern social science calls for some symp-
tomal reading. What we find are indicators of embryonic character. One example 
would be the passages in which Machiavelli relates Borgia’s way of “killing three 
birds with one stone”, when he kills his commanding officer, which makes the 
people happy, simultaneously scared and grateful, as well as eliminates a potential 
power rival. This is described in a very famous quotation in The Prince towards the 
end of chapter VII: 
“When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak mas-
ters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave them more 
cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was full of robbery, quarrels, 
and every kind of violence; and so, wishing to bring back peace and obedience to 
authority, he considered it necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he pro-
moted Messer Ramiro d’Orco (de Lorqua), a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave 
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the fullest power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the grea-
test success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not advisable to confer such 
excessive authority, for he had no doubt but that he would become odious, so he set 
up a court of judgment in the country, under a most excellent president, wherein all 
cities had their advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused 
some hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain 
them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been practised, it 
had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the minister. Under this 
pretence he took Ramiro and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the 
piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The barbarity of this 
spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied and dismayed.”
This passage is telling, because of its instrumentality; it is means-end rational 
policy science, in an ambience with weak institutions. 
The absolute rule and the creation of a strong secularized state (res publica) are 
part of Machiavelli’s context, in the aftermath of Savonarola’s theocracy. His rough 
ruler by no means is a Leviathan, instead being a produce of a democratic milieu, in 
the sense that the people in at least a mediated way is an instance of legitimacy. One 
might manipulate the people but tyranny is pointless and unstable. Weber’s views on 
the charismatic leader in the plebiscitary leadership democracy are at least in affinity 
with Machiavelli’s Prince. The central Machiavellian concepts of Virtu and Fortuna 
are parallel to indicators of charismatic leadership in Weber.
Both Machiavelli and Weber reflects their respective Zeitgeist but with a preserv ed 
core of universal validity (at least in the Occident, which however become ever more 
universal, with the diffusion of Western rationality). Like Machiavelli Weber lived 
in an era in search for national identity. His value-system is time-typical, albeit still 
relevant today, in the post 1989 predicament. Germany was politically retarded, for 
various reasons, only to mention the 30 Years war, Napoleon‘s destruction of the 
representative system of the First Reich, etc. 
Machiavelli’s The Prince as a useful manual for statecraft seems to mark a break 
with previous thinking
Machiavelli unlike Weber did not have a domesticized bourgeoisie to be disap-
pointed at. He had to turn to Il Principe as the beneficiary or agent of his theoretical 
efforts. Weber with his charismatic leader as a remedy against the petrification in the 
iron cage comes up in the end with a similar solution. The power vacuum after the 
fall of Bismarck had to be filled. Weber advocated a combination of strong leader-
ship and parliamentary control, which was a variation of parliamentarian rule adjus-
ted to the particular circumstances created by deutscher Sonderweg and the failure 
of liberalism in 1848. The Weberian notion of plebiscitary leadership democracy has 
caused much confusion. One reason is of course that Adolf Hitler might in retro-
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spect be seen as an example of the plebiscitary leader Weber called for. To Weber, 
however, contemporaries such as Lloyd George and Gladstone were the paradigma-
tic cases.
Weber’s British influences are clearly exposed in one of his “twin-lectures”, Poli-
tik als Beruf, where he extensively deals with Gladstone, calling him “der Diktator 
des Wahlschlachtsfeldes” and imposing a “Cäsaristisch-plebiszitäres Element in der 
Politik”: “Das faszinierende der ethischen Gehalt seiner Politik und vor allem an 
den ethischen Character seiner Persönlichkeit war es, der diese Maschine so schnell 
zum Siege über die Honoratioren führte”.38 Guenther Roth even writes about Weber 
that: “Manchmal klang er halb englisch”.39 The relation between Germany and the 
UK is an intriguing theme in its own right. In Weber’s case it is also another forma-
tive factor of importance for the proper interpretation of his oeuvre, due to his family 
history, with a branch of the family tree in fact being British residents, as Roth has 
documented in several works.40
Moreover, Carlyle’s romantic leader is another early British example, which 
Weber certainly was aware of. Now, these influences do not settle the question of 
similarities and differences between Weber and his British mentors. Weber’s sugges-
tions to modernized state forms are pragmatic and imprinted by the German back-
ground that generated a more pessimistic (Aron) or aristocratic (W. Mommsen) 
liberalism than the British are used to. 
Machiavelli and Weber share a lack of principle allegiances to one particular con-
stitution; they are both adjustable to changing realities. They are sometimes republi-
cans and sometimes monarchists. They do take matters of responsibility and calcu-
lability seriously. In Wilhelmine Germany the Kanzler was responsible to the Kai-
ser and not the parliament and Bismarck really treated the Reichstag as an austere 
countryside school teacher treated a bunch of not too receptive children. Bismarck 
was himself hit by this old fashioned form of authoritarian rule when the new Kai-
ser soon fired him, with a disastrous power vacuum to follow, as well as irrespon-
sible hazardous rule. Weber wanted parliamentarian rule introduced in Germany 
but in a fashion that had fertile soil given the background of the experiences of the 
German bourgeoisie.41 
This is one possible interpretation of Weber’s lack of democratic creed in the 
Anglo-American manner, a relativistic attitude that is moreover well attuned to his 
basic anti-natural law position. One might say that to both Machiavelli and Weber 
democracy is Brauch rather than Sitte.
Both Machiavelli and Weber are easily historicized – to place in a context, as 
it happened with several similarities despite the centuries between them. They are 
both also historicists in important respects, from a methodological point of view. 
Weber deliberately picks his values from history and culture and so his solution to 
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the norm-sender problem that we noticed above is a historicist solution. Machiavelli 
is much affected by Antiquity and in fact Florence in his days displays a remark-
able revival of Greek thought, with a Neo-Platonic academy and a political life, 
which is to quite some extent modelled after the city-states in Greece. That is part of 
the Renaissance. The notion of citizen creed in common to Weber and Machiavelli 
smacks of old Roman virtues. Historicism is a “mixed hat” and in this context I only 
want to note the historicist features in both thinkers, as in contrast to their ability to 
maintain our attention over the centuries, to remain alive and “bouncy”.42
Both Machiavelli’s and Weber’s work in important respects nevertheless marks a 
“break” with historicism. In the case of Machiavelli he launches almost premature a 
mode of analyses that is universal and well in line with marginalist economics. 
Weber’s methodological response to the crisis of historicism, from 1904 onwards, 
is a sort of helping hand to the historicist side in the aftermath of the Methoden-
streit between Schmoller and Menger, albeit simultaneously a transcendence of their 
limitations, in terms of lucid and accountable criteria for abstraction and selection 
that could serve as a remedy to uncontrolled value-intrusion in social science, what 
Myrdal later spoke of as “bias”. Since Weber takes part in the general resistance to 
unity of science his ambiguity is natural – but leaves room for various later interpre-
tations.43 His ideal-type is a tool for historical investigation but serves as a paradigm 
for later social research of various denominations. In the case of Machiavelli one 
might add that historicism44 in his days rather provided arguments for a secularized 
approach to social analyses. Yet, the core of historicism as such seemingly makes it 
not well attuned to secular science; in the case this implies timeless universal crite-
ria and methodological rules. 
Weber’s ideal type is often mystified and it is noteworthy that the formulation 
“einseitige Steigerung” only appears once in his collected methodological work, 
while he in several of his methodological essays demonstrates the marginal utility 
model as a prototype, with its isomorphic relation between concept and reality. 
Historicism as a problematic notion: There are at least two inconsistencies in his-
toricism exposing it for criticism. No matter its mainly idiographical and induc-
tivist character, stressing the uniqueness of historical phenomena, many a histori-
cist turned – nevertheless – to history in order to find precisely timeless, objective, 
essential meaning, alien to his own approach. We find such attitudes in Ranke and 
Schmoller, as well as in neo-Kantians like Rickert later on. The inherent relativism 
in historicism really is a hard blow to value objectivism in general and natural law 
thinking in particular. Some historicists still continued to look for eternal cultural 
values. One way to put it is that the historicists did not quite see the full consequen-
ces of their own approach. This lingering “Drang nach Wertung” is even more para-
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doxical in the case of the neo-Kantians, since they provide the tool with which Max 
Weber goes beyond historicism, towards more intersubjectivity and cumulativity – 
less “impressionism”. 
It might be puzzling but is still the case that the combination of historicism and 
value-objectivism – both targets for Weber’s methodological renewal – is a frequent 
albeit not very logical combination; also that natural law thinkers and historicists 
consequently both could be value-objectivists. This, however, does not alter my 
general long trend of secularization, already visible as a potential realm in Thomas 
Aquinas, more visible in the embryonic methodological achievements of Machia-
velli, then advancing with Hobbes and Pufendorf and exploding at the last turn of 
centuries, with the parallel and largely independent works by Weber, Hägerström, 
Westermarck and Kelsen. 
No matter the methodological “bold” character of any comparison between 
Weber and Machiavelli I still suggest that it might be fertile to the understanding of 
Machiavelli’s role in social science, as well as to recent debate on the proper interpre-
tation of Weber’s views on science vs. politics. 
 
Concluding remarks
Basically  – and this is the basis for their significant role in the history of social 
science doctrines – Machiavelli and Weber are both deliberated from natural law 
metaphysics, Weber explicitly and Machiavelli rather being a-natural law. The struc-
ture of their analyses is imprinted by calculability, allowing for testability, and the 
rational economic actor is the basic metaphor.
This early “rational choice” differs in kind from the more purely sociological 
tradition, which is created in Scottish Enlightenment and then furthered by Saint-
Simon/Comte and later Durkheim and Simmel. But this is an altogether different 
story. 
The antagonism between homo sociologicus and homo economicus is a long 
story – and homo economicus manifests an anti-sociological tradition within socio-
logy, of which sociology is full. If the intrusion of the rational actor model into ever 
more areas of analyses of the social is a gain or not is not evaluated in this essay, 
which attempts a diagnosis without a prescription. The rational actor paradigm is 
a strong paradigm and more amorphous disciplines are very vulnerable; yet it is a 
weak paradigm too, since it might generate a lot of hypotheses and predictions, but 
hardly explain anything. It is an attractive model but weak as a theory.
Weber is not a paradigmatic classic in the Kuhnian sense but rather a mediator 
with an extremely strategic position in the history of social thought. Steinert exemp-
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lifies with the less well-known Lujo Brentano whose scholarship on early capitalism 
was as sophisticated as Weber’s, but less cited, while Weber provoked a voluminous 
debate already during his lifetime.45
Rational science, missing in India and other previous high cultures, is the core 
of irreversible Western rationality – the “squirrel’s wheel” that conquered the whole 
world. How this could happen so rapidly is a challenge for historians to explain. 
Weber’s “bold conjecture” might have many flaws but has undoubtedly played a 
significant role, nourished by the American experience, where it is easy to find many 
walking “ideal-types” of flesh and blood, as supportive evidence.46 Criticizing Weber 
for flaws in his empirical supportive evidence is really shooting at a sitting bird; in 
addition it is easy to list anomalies calling for ad hoc-reasoning. In case we are more 
interested in the birth of modern capitalism than Weber’s significance for our search 
for identity I think both Werner Sombart and R. K. Merton might be more reward-
ing reading.47
Returning to Steinert, he is right in telling us that such grand narratives – as well 
as grand theories – are irrefutable, unable to meet Popperian criteria for falsifica-
tion. However, this is a rather obvious and trivial point. Weber might agree, since his 
main intellectual life project was to gather further supportive evidence for his thesis, 
in his comparative sociology of religion.48
Most of Steinert’s criticism of Weber appears as hard to refute, although there 
are no new sensational revelations. Already Kurt Samuelsson documented flaws in 
Weber’s empirical supportive evidence.49 Typical for Weber is that he some times 
is on the border of plagiarism, like in the case of his dependence of Ferdinand 
Kürnberger’s Der Amerikamüde, in the vivid depictions of urban entrepreneurial 
life in the USA.50
The value of Steinert’s book is the emphasis on the German historical context, 
which – and rightly so – goes beyond what is common practice in America. Trans-
Atlantic reciprocity is a significant theme, in particular in the case of Weber, the 
reception of whom was retarded in Germany and meanwhile cultivated in the USA, 
promoted by migrants such as Sorokin and others. Steinert’s book here has bridge-
building qualities. This calls for a translation into English. Methodologically it is 
easy to note that contextualization is a necessity for full and congenial interpreta-
tion of an old text. In reality it is difficult to market such an ambition in a situation 
when sociologists don’t know much about history and historians by nature are a bit 
alien to theory, manifesting a main divide over the last two centuries, and central in 
famous Methodenstreit as well. 
One example: The gap to bridge is obvious in the case of such a Weberian con-
cept as “Plebiscitary leadership democracy”, where it makes sense to relate to the 
Legacy from Bismarck, illiberalism among the German Bildungsbürgertum, and the 
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concept of delayed nation and perhaps Napoleon’s ambiguous role – but somewhere 
there we are confronted with limits if one realistically wishes to reach out to an Ame-
rican undergraduate readership, so the Westphalian peace, LIMES, etc, has to be 
large ly left out, due to didactic concerns. To go into details about German federalism 
and the constitutional capabilities of the Kaiser in Prussia vs. in the new Germany as 
a whole is also doomed to be seeding on the flat rock. 
However, Steinert shows convincingly the impact of Deutscher Sonderweg on 
Weber’s Calvinist thesis (Kulturkampf and Kulturprotestantismus). Still today the 
religious factor is far more important in German social and political life than it is 
conceivable for a, for instance, secularized Swede to understand. Some of the most 
enlightening recent works on the manifestations of the cultural conflicts in Germany 
in late 19th century are not yet translated, only to mention Gangolf Hübinger.51 
We can safely assume that Weber’s Huguenot roots makes him sensitive for the 
role of Puritanism, which is moreover also quite in line with Bismarck’s state-buil-
ding, based on common value-assumptions imprinted by non-Catholic Prussian 
traditions. Weber’s thesis is a contemporary act in politics as well. Weber moreover 
got the Puritan ethic with the Mother’s milk, Helene being extremely religious. Des-
pite being primarily a scholar in jurisprudence and early Agrarian history Max was 
more knowledgeable in theological issues than most of his contemporaries.
Far more details, following the vein of the Cambridge school of contextualism, 
are needed, also since the close context was so obvious for those involved at the 
time – tensions between nation building and international movements, such as Mar-
xism and Catholicism – that they tend to be “apocryphal” when later generations 
only see the text. It seems that the same policy concerns inspire Weber 1905 and 
1920 as already in his Freiburger Antrittsrede 1895, with its anti-Catholic tendency.
Moreover, Steinert is very comprehensive in his treatment of Weber’s views on 
the birth of Capitalist irreversible rationalization (Modernization). His criticism 
seems to be on the whole fair and right, even if grumpy in tone and somewhat exag-
gerated, if he believes that Weber’s thesis is refuted and not only not possible to 
refute by test. 
Since Weber argued for a thesis he could not be expected to be a master proto-
type for path dependency of Modernization, and is of course today also rather a 
sparring partner to the multi-modernity paradigm, as we find it in works by Eisen-
stadt, Arnason, Wittrock and others.52
Some of Steinert’s criticism follows along well-trodden paths. The language gulf 
has its imprints and the Anglo-Saxon discourse is infected by language “parochia-
lism”, only taking into account what is translated, even if Anglo-Saxons like to con-
template the proper interpretation of some common concepts, such as Angst and 
Beruf. In the case of Weber’s sociology of religion English language imperialism has 
121ÖZG 23 | 2012 | 3
been damaging since the revised final edition of 1920 and the debate Weber himself 
was involved in (extensively documented by Johannes Winckelmann) has not been 
taken into account, until rather late.53
On the other hand, Bill Swatos jr has documented how Weber’s most likely 
misunderstood what his hillbilly relatives in Mt. Airy, NC, told him, about sects and 
civic associational life and entrepreneurialism.54 However, Weber’s misunderstan-
ding might be a lucky mistake, making something more explicit in an ideal-typical 
manner of Steigerung. This is a case of trans-Atlantic reciprocity and what Claus Offe 
calls Selbstbetrachtung aus der Ferne,55 that in this case Weber’s Benjamin Franklin-
inspired understanding about trust and economic success might be quite correct 
even if supportive evidence murky. 
In general Weber’s Sect-essay is a very good shortcut to understanding the Cal-
vinist thesis, in contrast to the work on the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capita-
lism, which makes torturous reading.56
Steinert’s book is part of several Weberian discourses but the most challenging, 
I would argue, is the search for optimal balancing between contextualizing the past 
from the vantage point of a present day research agenda. Modernity is a gradual pro-
cess. 
The perhaps most important point in Steinert’s work is, again, the shift from 
Weber 1905 to the more general culturalist Weber of 1920, from the birth of capita-
lism to the more general birth of Occidental rationalization/secularization.
Weber’s path-breaking thesis about Puritanism and Modern “take off ” have 
good hopes to survive both Steinert’s attack as those by competing notions, by multi-
Modernity thinkers and anti-secularists. Nevertheless Steinert reduces trans-Atlan-
tic misunderstandings and contributes to a more informed debate in matters of 
interpretation.
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Appendix 1: 
There are numerous affinities (a weak concept) between Max Weber and Machia-
velli.
1. They are both “rational actors”. Zweckrationalität or means-end-rationality, is the 
main characteristic of their instrumental manuals for statecraft.
2. They are examples of Realpolitik, with little of wishful thinking obscuring their 
mapping of social and political reality.
3. They have a brutal clarity in their prose, as in Weber’s letters to Michels or 
Machiavelli’s narrative of Caesare Borgia’s way of disposing of his leading officer 
Messer Remirro in Romagna, or Weber’s definition of the state and its monopoly 
on legal violence.
4. The decisive role of violence in politics is recognized by both, power and force 
being intertwined concepts. 
5. They are both in a sense ‘historicists’, in the way they rely on historical lessons, in 
particular in their ‘republican’ writings.
6. They are both nationalists – or rather patriots, to avoid an anachronism – in their 
explicit engagement for establishing a stable state power. 
7. This manifests raison d’etat and state idealism, as explicit normative elements in 
their endeavour.
8. “Double moral” is of course a famous element too, or rather a “functional view” 
of belief systems as important for social peace and legitimacy. This is strangely 
in common not only to Parsons but also to anti-democratic elitists such as Plato 
and Leo Strauss.
9. They are both “democrats”, of sort, in the sense that the people are a decisive 
instance for bringing about legitimacy. 
10. They are thus both “relativists” in terms of validity of values. This partly follows 
from their historicism which is promoting relativism, just as Troeltsch was con-
cerned about. Ultimate values have no cognitive truth content.
11. Charisma is an important element to both, although Machiavelli does not use the 
very word, rather speaks about reputation.
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